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PIRACY IN RUSSIA AND CHINA:




The development of copyright law in Russia and China is similar in several
respects.  Both countries developed their copyright laws much later than did
Western Europe.  Both countries refused to adopt international copyright
agreements until pressured by other members of the international community,
particularly the United States.  Both countries refused adequately to protect
foreign works.  Despite these similarities, however, Russia and China have ex-
perienced very different treatment from the United States when U.S. copyrights
have been violated.  On the one hand, the United States has aggressively pur-
sued trade sanctions against China to force it to adopt stricter intellectual prop-
erty laws.  With Russia, on the other hand, the United States has adopted a
much milder approach and has not threatened trade remedies, despite the wide-
spread piracy of U.S. works in Russia.  In general, the United States has ap-
peared to pursue different political, economic, and military goals in its relation-
ships with Russia and China.  For example, the United States supported the
Russian government after the collapse of the Soviet Union and sought to
strengthen the Russian economy, rather than possibly weakening it with threats
of trade sanctions.  In contrast, the United States threatened trade sanctions
against China in an attempt to reduce the U.S. trade imbalance with China.  In
addition, U.S. policy toward China has been influenced by events in Tiananmen
Square and other human rights abuses as well as China’s policy of exporting
arms and nuclear technology to Third World countries.  By contrast, the United
States has sought to maintain good relations with Russia to influence its policies
of disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation.  Finally, the United States has
attacked piracy more aggressively in China because China exports its pirated
works from the United States into Western markets, resulting in the direct
competition of these low-cost, pirated works with legitimate U.S. works.  For all
of these reasons, the United States has pursued China’s copyright abuses more
aggressively than it has pursued similar abuses by Russia.  This article attempts
to explain the reasons for this disparate treatment.
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This article supplements the treatment of intellectual property law in Law
and Contemporary Problems, including the Spring 1996 issue on the Lanham
Act.  Part II of this article traces the indigenous historical development of Rus-
sia’s copyright system during the era of tsarist rule in Russia up to the Soviet era
and explores more recent responses to external pressures from other members
of the international community, in particular the United States.  In similar
fashion, Part III traces the historical development of China’s copyright system,
indigenously as well as in response to U.S. trade pressures.  Part IV then exam-
ines the U.S. response to piracy in Russia and China and attempts to explain the
disparate treatment.
II
HISTORY OF RUSSIA’S COPYRIGHT LAW
Although Russia developed its first copyright law in the early nineteenth
century, it did not adhere to international copyright agreements until almost
150 years later, when external pressures forced the then-Soviet Union to adapt
its laws to more stringent international norms.
A. Indigenous Development of Russia’s Copyright Law
Russia produced many of the great composers and authors of the world, but
it lagged behind Western Europe in its development of copyright law by almost
a century.1  Western European countries published books in Slavic languages—
and even used the Cyrillic alphabet—soon after the invention of the printing
press in 1476, but Russia did not publish its first known book until 1564, almost
a century later.2  Despite its late development, Russia’s copyright law followed a
similar path to the laws of Western Europe in the early years.  Like its Euro-
pean counterparts, the Russian monarchy sought to control the dissemination of
information by controlling printing.3  The Russian government regulated the
domestic creation of works and the importation of foreign works with the goal
of maintaining the state’s authority.4  For example, between the time of the
reign of Ivan the Terrible and Peter the Great’s accession to the throne, print-
1. Russia’s first copyright law was enacted in 1828.  See infra note 10 and accompanying text.
England’s first copyright law, the Statute of Queen Anne, was enacted in 1709 and is widely considered
to be the first law on authors’ rights.  See EDWARD W. PLOMAN & L. CLARK HAMILTON, COPYRIGHT:
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 12 (1980).
2. See MICHAEL A. NEWCITY, COPYRIGHT LAW IN THE SOVIET UNION 4 (1978) (tracing the de-
velopment of copyright law in Russia from tsarist Russia through the Soviet era) [hereinafter
NEWCITY, COPYRIGHT LAW].  The first known book published in Russia was ACTS OF THE APOSTLES
AND MESSAGES OF THE BLESSED APOSTLE PAUL.  See id.
3. The early history of intellectual property laws in Europe developed out of a similar desire of
the state to control the spread of information.  See PLOMAN & HAMILTON, supra note 1, at 9 (noting
that the interest and subsequent intervention of governments in the trade of printed materials was mo-
tivated by three principal concerns: the spread of knowledge, control, and greed).
4. See NEWCITY, COPYRIGHT LAW, supra note 2, at 4.
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ing was reserved almost exclusively for religious works.5  During his reign, Peter
considerably loosened the restrictions on printing to permit—and indeed to en-
courage—the printing of books on secular subjects, including science, educa-
tion, and culture.6  In a dramatic shift from earlier monarchs, Peter encouraged
the importation and translation of foreign works.7  Subsequent monarchs (ex-
cept for Catherine during the early part of her reign before the French Revolu-
tion) reversed many of Peter’s liberal gains, and the state again strictly con-
trolled printing: Unrestricted printers were closed, foreign works were
prohibited, and censors controlled the subject matter of books.8
During this period in Russia, from the publication of the first known book in
the late 1500s until the mid 1820s, the numbers of private printers and books in-
creased significantly.9  With more publishers came more opportunities for pi-
rating works.  In response to the threat of piracy, Russia enacted its first copy-
right law, the Censorship Code and Statements on the Rights of the Writer of
1828 (“Copyright Law of 1828”), to prevent the unauthorized publication and
distribution of works.10  Notably, Russian publishers were free to publish foreign
works, either in the original language or in Russian translation.11  After its en-
actment, several changes were made to the Copyright Law of 1828.12  The most
significant change for foreign authors came in 1857 when the Council of State
extended copyright protection to foreign authors who first published their
works in Russia.13  After undergoing several amendments, the Copyright Law of
1828 was overhauled when a government-appointed commission drafted the
new 1911 Copyright Act.14  Foreign authors did gain some rights in the 1911 Act:
Even though foreign works first published abroad were in the public domain
and could be freely translated into Russian, they could not be published in their
original languages in Russia without the authors’ consent.15  According to one
commentator, the 1911 Act “can be considered the corner-stone of the devel-
5. During the seventeenth century, 483 books were printed in Moscow, and only seven were non-
religious works.  See id.
6. During Peter’s reign from 1708 until 1725, more books were published than in the preceding
150 years.  See id. at 5.
7. Not much later, however, in 1771, Russian printers were permitted to reproduce foreign works.
Even then, Russian censors screened the foreign works.  See id.
8. See id. at 5-6.
9. See id. at 6.
10. See id. at 6-7.
11. See id. at 7-8.
12. In 1830, the Council of State issued a decree that permitted authors to assign and transfer their
works.  In 1857, the Council of State extended the length of a copyright from life of the author plus 25
years to life of the author plus 50 years.  In 1887, almost 50 years after its enactment, the copyright law
was separated from the censorship statute and placed in the law of property.  See id.
13. See id. at 7.
14. See id. at 8-10 (describing the development and structure of the 1911 act); see also Bernie R.
Burrus, The Soviet Law of Inventions and Copyright, 30 FORDHAM L. REV. 693, 711-13 (1962) (sum-
marizing the development of copyright law in Russia and the Soviet Union).  The 1911 copyright law
was modeled on the German copyright law of 1901.  See NEWCITY, COPYRIGHT LAW, supra note 2, at
7.
15. See NEWCITY, COPYRIGHT LAW, supra note 2, at 9.
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opment of copyright legislation under the imperial regime.”16  As such, it repre-
sented the last change to Russia’s copyright regime under imperial Russia.  The
Bolshevik Revolution and the rise of Leninism ushered in many changes, and
copyright law was not immune from its influence.
In the years immediately following the Bolshevik Revolution, the new So-
viet government sought to eradicate market influences and launched a program
of nationalization and monopolization of property, including intellectual prop-
erty.  To accomplish its objectives, the Soviet government issued several copy-
right decrees whose purpose was to nationalize the Russian classics, monopolize
publishing rights and the publishing industry, establish remuneration schedules
for authors of published works, and abolish copyright protection after the death
of the author.17  The confiscatory approach of the early Soviet years was short-
lived.  Under Vladimir Lenin’s New Economic Policy of 1921, the government
sought to encourage private enterprise.18  As part of its efforts, the government
enacted its first copyright law in 1925 and later amended it in 1928.19  Signifi-
cantly, both laws retained the state’s authority to nationalize the works of any
author without his consent and denied protection to foreign authors unless they
first published their works in the Soviet Union.20  The copyright law remained
largely unchanged for the next thirty years, and Russians complained that the
statute lagged behind technological developments and, in fact, hindered tech-
nological progress.21  In response, the Soviet government enacted the Funda-
mentals of Civil Legislation, which, for the first time, sought to integrate copy-
right law into the civil code.22
During this period of the Soviet era, from its inception until the 1960s, the
Soviet Union was largely isolationist in its views toward international intellec-
tual property agreements.  When its economic interests were at stake, however,
the Soviet Union later joined the Universal Copyright Convention (“UCC”)
and modified its copyright laws accordingly.  The next section describes the in-
ternational influence on Soviet copyright law and looks back to the interna-
tional influence on earlier copyright law under tsarist Russia.
16. CORIEN PRINS, COMPUTER PROGRAM PROTECTION IN THE USSR 118 (1991) (providing an
overview of the history of Russian copyright law).
17. See Serge L. Levitsky, Introduction to Soviet Copyright Law, in LAW IN EASTERN EUROPE 31
(Z. Szirmai ed., 1964).  Based on the decree of Nov. 26, 1918, the works of many prominent Russian
composers were nationalized, including those of Tchaikovsky and Mussorgsky.  See id. at 32.
18. See Michael Newcity, Russian Intellectual Property Reform: Towards a Market Paradigm, 36
GERMAN Y.B. INT’L L. 328, 330 (1993) [hereinafter Newcity, Russian Intellectual Property Reform].
19. See PRINS, supra note 16, at 122-24.  As fundamentals of copyright law, the 1925 and 1928 laws
served as the basis for subsequent copyright legislation in the republics.  See id.
20. See NEWCITY, COPYRIGHT LAW, supra note 2, at 22-23.
21. See PRINS, supra note 16, at 124.
22. See Fundamental Principles of Civil Legislation of the U.S.S.R. and Union Republics (1961),
reprinted in SOVIET CODES OF LAW 511 (William B. Simons ed., 1980).  For a description of the Soviet
copyright law embodied in the civil code, see OLIMPIAD S. IOFFE, SOVIET CIVIL LAW 325-41 (1988).
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B. Development of Russia’s Copyright Law in Response to External Pressures
At least as early as 1732, Russia recognized the significance of international
copyright protection.  During that year, the Russian monarch Anna Ioannovna
forbade the importation of works that had been created in Russia but then re-
published abroad.23  Although issuing state edicts had been a common method
of protecting copyrighted works during the eighteenth century, during the nine-
teenth century, countries turned to bilateral copyright agreements to protect
their works.24  Russia signed its first bilateral copyright agreement with France
in 1861 and signed an agreement with Belgium one year later.25  This method of
international copyright protection lasted through much of the nineteenth cen-
tury.  Countries later adopted a multilateral approach, and many signed the
landmark Berne Convention in 1886.26  Russia, however, refused to sign the
Berne Convention for three principal reasons.  First, and most important, sign-
ing the Convention would result in huge costs to the Russian government.  Be-
cause Russia was a prolific consumer of foreign literature, it would have been
obligated to pay royalties to Convention members.27  Second, the Russian gov-
ernment regarded the Convention as a device to protect the interests of pub-
lishers while ignoring the interests of authors and greater society.28  Finally, ad-
herence to the Convention would have forced the Russian government to
abolish its policy of free translation.  The Russian government relied on free-
dom of translation to disseminate creative works to its multilingual population.29
Instead of signing the Berne Convention, Russia maintained its strategy of ne-
gotiating bilateral agreements.30
Those bilateral agreements either ended on their own or were rescinded by
the Soviet government after the Bolshevik Revolution.  During the first decades
after the Revolution, the Soviet government was strictly isolationist and repudi-
ated international copyright agreements because it believed that the interna-
tional agreements served the capitalistic publishers at the expense of the
authors.  In reality, the Soviet Union likely refused to join the Berne Conven-
tion and the subsequent UCC for the same reasons that tsarist Russia had re-
fused:  The government did not want to pay huge royalties to foreign authors,
and it valued the freedom of translation, which allowed the government to dis-
seminate its message to its multilingual constituency.31
23. See M.M. BOGUSLAVSKY, COPYRIGHT IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: INTERNATIONAL
PROTECTION OF LITERARY AND SCIENTIFIC WORKS 66 (David Catterns ed., N. Poulet trans., 1979).
24. See NEWCITY, COPYRIGHT LAW, supra note 2, at 10-11.
25. See BOGUSLAVSKY, supra note 23, at 67-73.
26. See Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, 828
U.N.T.S. 221.
27. See PRINS, supra note 16, at 119.
28. See id.
29. See id. at 120.
30. See BOGUSLAVSKY, supra note 23, at 68-70.  Russia signed another bilateral agreement with
France in 1911, with Germany in 1913, with Belgium in 1915, and with Denmark in 1915.  See id.
31. See NEWCITY, supra note 2, at 32-33.
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Even during its years of isolation, the Soviet Union recognized the need for
Western assistance in its efforts to industrialize.  This need for Western tech-
nology ultimately would lead the Soviet Union out of isolation and into the
world community of intellectual property protection.  Anxious to accelerate the
process of industrialization, the Soviet leaders pursued a policy of rapid acquisi-
tion of foreign technology, or technology transfer.32  “While the Bolshevik re-
gime bitterly denounced foreign imperialists . . . [it] welcomed capitalist tech-
nology, importing foreign technicians to teach them how to do things and
imitating Western products, plans and processes.”33  The Soviet government
hired U.S. companies to build facilities in the Soviet Union, including dams and
industrial complexes, and sent its engineers to the United States to learn how to
operate the facilities.34  The Soviet Union also licensed foreign technology,
though foreign governments and companies demanded protection for their in-
tellectual property in return.  To ensure its continued access to licensed West-
ern technology and to assure foreign owners of intellectual property that their
works would be protected, the Soviet Union, for the first time, joined an inter-
national intellectual property convention, the Paris Convention for the Protec-
tion of Industrial Property.35
The Soviet Union next faced pressure from the United States to join the
Universal Copyright Convention. During bilateral trade negotiations, the
United States negotiated Soviet accession to the UCC in exchange for substan-
tial tax concessions.36  The United States was responding to domestic political
pressure from authors who lost royalties because their copyrights were not rec-
ognized in the Soviet Union.37  The Soviets finally agreed and joined the UCC in
1973.38  Accession to the UCC required that the Soviet legislature revise its
copyright law and abolish its long-lived freedom of translation policy.39
32. See SUSAN K. SELL, POWER AND IDEAS: NORTH-SOUTH POLITICS OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY AND ANTITRUST 49-50 (1998).
33. Melvin Kranzberg, The Technical Elements in International Technology Transfer: Historical
Perspectives, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 31, 35
(John R. McIntyre & David S. Papp eds., 1986).
34. See SELL, supra note 32, at 49.  For example, in 1929, Ford built an automobile factory in
Gorky, and the Soviet Union sent its engineers to Detroit to learn Ford’s production techniques.  See
id.  “Once the factory began producing Model A Fords under a Russian name, the connection with
Ford ended and everybody went home.”  Kranzberg, supra note 33, at 35.
35. See Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1983, 21 U.S.T. 1583.
36. For a detailed description of the trade talks, see Newcity, Russian Intellectual Property Reform,
supra note 18, at 331-34.
37. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, argued that U.S. tax laws suppressed Soviet sales and li-
censes of Soviet technology in the United States.  See id. at 331-32.
38. See Universal Copyright Convention, Sept. 6, 1952, 6 U.S.T. 2731, 216 U.N.T.S. 132.  Observers
in the West feared that the Soviet Union would use the UCC to suppress the writings of dissidents.  See
Lee Jeffrey Ross, Jr., Soviet Accession to the Universal Copyright Convention: Possible Implications for
Future Foreign Publication of Dissidents’ Works, 4 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 404 (1974); Alan Schwartz,
Russian Roulette, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 1973, at 29.
39. See PRINS, supra note 16, at 130.  To comply with the UCC, the Soviet legislature adopted
amendments to its civil code on copyrights in 1973.  See Newcity, Russian Intellectual Property Reform,
supra note 18, at 332.
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Even though the international community applauded the Soviet Union’s ac-
cession to the intellectual property conventions, problems persisted.40  The most
significant problem was the inadequate protection of foreign works in the So-
viet Union.  Foreign authors received the same level of protection in the Soviet
Union as Soviet citizens enjoyed; that protection, however, was significantly less
than the foreign authors received in their home countries.41  For example, the
Soviet Union retained the power to compel licensing of foreign works and to
exclude certain forms of intellectual property from protection.  Computer pro-
grams and algorithms, for example, received neither copyright nor patent pro-
tection.42  The international community, particularly the United States, exerted
pressure on the Soviet Union to join the Berne Convention so that foreign
authors would receive greater protection in the Soviet Union.43
The United States negotiated a bilateral agreement with the Soviet Union in
which, among other conditions, the Soviet Union agreed to join the Berne Con-
vention in exchange for the United States’ grant of “most-favored nation”
trading status.44  The agreement was signed by Presidents Bush and Gorbachev
in June 1990, but President Bush held up Congressional action on the agree-
ment until Soviet officials agreed to reduce piracy of U.S. films and to enact less
restrictive immigration laws.45  In response to U.S. pressure, on May 31, 1991,
the Soviet Union enacted Chapter IV of the Fundamentals of Civil Legislation,
which contained principles for a new copyright law.46  Before the Fundamentals
40. During later bilateral negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union, the U.S.
Copyright Office identified several problems with the Soviet copyright laws, including “the failure to
protect computer programs and databases adequately under copyright law; the failure to protect sound
recordings adequately; incomplete public performance rights; overly broad fair use and personal use
exemptions; and inadequate enforcement mechanisms generally.”  Hearings Before the House Judiciary
Subcomm. on Intellectual Property and Judicial Admin., 101st Cong. (1991) (statement of Ralph Oman,
Register of Copyrights), reprinted in [New Developments 1987-1991 Transfer Binder] Copyright L.
Rep. (CCH) ¶ 20,638 (May 16, 1991).
41. See Newcity, Russian Intellectual Property Reform, supra note 18, at 332.
42. See id.
43. The Berne Convention provided more protection for authors, and the international community
hoped that Soviet accession to the Berne Convention would reduce the rampant piracy in the Soviet
Union.  See Copyright is Everybody’s Business, UNESCO COURIER (FRANCE), June 1991, at 48; Her-
bert Mitgang, Old Copyright Treaty: New Shield for U.S. Artists, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 1989, at B7.
44. See U.S.S.R.-U.S.: Agreement on Trade Relations, June 1, 1990, 29 I.L.M. 946 (1990).  Article
VIII of the agreement contains several conditions regarding the future protection of intellectual prop-
erty between the two countries, including an agreement to protect computer programs and databases
under domestic copyright laws and to expand copyright protection to sound recordings.  See id. at 955-
56.
45. The Motion Picture Association of America (“MPAA”) and its president Jack Valenti exerted
enormous pressure on the Bush administration to delay ratification of the agreement until the Soviets
modified their copyright laws better to protect U.S. films from foreign pirates.  See Lana C. Fleishman,
The Empire Strikes Back: The Influence of the United States Motion Picture Industry on Russian Copy-
right Law, 26 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 189 (1993) (describing in detail the successful lobbying efforts of the
MPAA and the influence of the MPAA on Russia’s copyright laws).  The MPAA, at that time, esti-
mated that it lost $1.2 billion each year to foreign pirates.  See id. at 218.
46. See PRINS, supra note 16, at 134.  Interestingly, Mr. Valenti was still not satisfied with Soviet
protection of U.S. films, perhaps in part because state-owned television broadcast two Arnold Schwar-
zenegger films without permission from the U.S. distributors.  See id. at 134-35.
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became effective, however, the Soviet Union collapsed.47  After the dissolution
of the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation assumed responsibility for the
trade agreement in a letter to the U.S. Department of State.48  To comply with
the trade agreement, Russia enacted a series of intellectual property laws, in-
cluding a law to protect computer programs and databases49 and a law to protect
integrated circuit topologies.50  Russia then enacted a new, comprehensive copy-
right law in 1993, On Copyright and Neighboring Rights,51 and, two years later,
joined the Berne Convention.52
Even though Russia incorporated international copyright norms into its
copyright laws and joined both the UCC and the Berne Conventions, the
United States remains dissatisfied with Russian efforts to combat its rampant
piracy.53  Video piracy and software piracy are the leading sources of counter-
47. The United States, as promised, did enact most-favored nation legislation for the Soviet Union.
It was short-lived, however, as the Soviet Union collapsed only months later.  See Most-Favored-Nation
Treatment: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Pub. L. No. 102-197, 105 Stat. 1622 (1991).
48. See Russian Federation-United States: Exchange of Notes Concerning the Entry into Force of
the Agreement on Trade Relations, June 17, 1991, 31 I.L.M. 790 (1992).  Russia also adopted the 1961
Fundamentals of Civil Legislation from the Soviet era pending adoption of the new Russian civil code.
See Newcity, Russian Intellectual Property Reform, supra note 18, at 337 and note 23 (citing Resolution
of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation, July 14, 1992, On the Regulation of Civil Law Rela-
tions in the Period of Realization of Economic Reforms, VEDOMOSTI S’EZDA NARODNYKH
DEPUTATOV R.F., No. 30 (July 30, 1992), Item 1800).  For a discussion of the Russian Federation’s de-
cision, see Fratislav Pechota, Russian Federation Reaches Back to 1991 USSR Fundamentals of Civil
Law, 3 SEEL; SURV. E. EUR. L., Aug.-Sept. 1992, at 5.
49. See Computer Software and Database Protection Act, reprinted in 3 BUSINESS AND
COMMERCIAL LAWS OF RUSSIA § 9.04 (John P. Hupp ed., 1995).  For a discussion of the Russian in-
tellectual property legislation, see Peter B. Maggs, New Russian Intellectual Property Legislation, 3
SEEL; SURV. E. EUR. L., Nov. 1992, at 1.
50. See Integrated Circuit Lay-Out Protection Act, reprinted in 3 BUSINESS AND COMMERCIAL
LAWS OF RUSSIA § 9.05 (John P. Hupp ed., 1995).  For a discussion of the Russian intellectual property
legislation, see Maggs, supra note 49, at 1.
51. See RF Copyright Act, reprinted in 3 BUSINESS AND COMMERCIAL LAWS OF RUSSIA § 9.08
(John P. Hupp ed., 1995).  The new copyright law replaced Chapter IV of the 1961 Fundamentals of
Civil Legislation.  Even after adopting its new copyright law, Russia has modified it as needed.  For ex-
ample, Russia entered into an agreement—Agreement on Partnership and Cooperation—on June 24,
1994, with the European Union to harmonize its copyright law with the European Union’s laws.  See
Michiel Elst, The Interaction of European Community and Russian Copyright Law: A Matter of Part-
nership and Cooperation, 22 REV. CENT. & E. EUR. L. 267, 277-329 (1996) (comparing the copyright
regimes in Russia and the European Union and concluding that Russian copyright law substantially
converges with the European Union’s harmonized copyright law).
52. See News, 26 IIC, INT’L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 451, 455 (1995).
53. The International Intellectual Property Association (“IIPA”), which represents the motion pic-
ture, sound recording, computer software, and publishing industries, estimated that in 1997, piracy of
motion pictures in Russia resulted in losses of $312 million; software losses were $400 million; audio
recordings losses were $165 million; and book publishing losses were $45 million.  See Don E. Tomlin-
son, Intellectual Property in the Digital Age: The Piracy/Counterfeiting Problem and Antipiracy and An-
ticounterfeiting Measures, CURRENTS: INT’L TRADE L.J. 1, 6 Summer 1999.  Even if industry estimates
of losses due to piracy are speculative, one need only visit a Moscow market to see collections of soft-
ware, such as Microsoft Windows 95, sold on compact discs (“CD”) for just $3.30, a fraction of the cost
of even a single item of software.  See Sergei Blagov, Media-Russia: Copyright Pirates Run Riot, INTER
PRESS SERV., Mar. 7, 1998, available in LEXIS, News Library, INPRES File.  Cf. Rosalind M. Parker,
Protecting American Television Programming in Russia, China, Taiwan, and Japan, 17 HASTINGS
COMM. & ENT. L.J. 445 (1995) (arguing that U.S. television broadcasters and television program sup-
pliers should not be concerned with Russian piracy because most larger Russian television stations ad-
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feiting in Russia.  Nearly all of the videos sold in Russia are pirated.54  In the
1990s, industry trade groups estimated that the software piracy rate in Russia
exceeded ninety percent.55  The primary culprits have been government enter-
prises,56 but there are small signs of improvements:  President Yeltsin ordered
the Presidential Council and State Duma to use only licensed programs.57  Addi-
tionally, legitimate software sales exceeded one million dollars a month in 1995,
and one Microsoft executive commented that “Russia is still a superpower of
piracy, but it’s getting much better.”58  These examples, however, seem to be the
exception, not the rule.59  Industry trade groups such as the Business Software
Alliance (“BSA”) and Software Publishers Association (“SPA”) assert that
Russia’s efforts, while laudable, are inadequate to reduce the levels of piracy.60
here to copyright protection, any retransmissions of their programs will necessarily be of lower quality,
and scrambling devices can reduce the likelihood of piracy).  See generally Tim Kuik, Piracy in Russia:
An Epidemic, 20 WHITTIER L. REV. 831 (1999).
54. See Amy Harmon, Russia Has Begun the Daunting Task of Cracking Down on its Massive
“Gray Market” for Intellectual Property, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 19, 1996, at D3.  The MPAA estimated that
video piracy cost the motion picture industry more than $300 million in 1997.  See Will Englund, Mod-
ern Pirates Thrive in Russia, BALTIMORE SUN, Jan. 27, 1998, at 1A.  Top Hollywood releases can even
be seen on unlicensed videocassettes in Russia before their U.S. premieres.  See Russians Back Plan to
End Film Piracy, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, July 23, 1997, at 31A.
55. See Software Trade Groups Target Pirates, NEWSBYTES NEWS NETWORK, Feb. 14, 1995, avail-
able in LEXIS, Market Library, PROMT File; Vladimir Mikheyev, Russian Market Should Have No
Place for “Pirates,” CURRENT DIG. OF POST-SOV. PRESS, Dec. 23, 1992, available in LEXIS, News Li-
brary, CDSP File.  Pirated CDs of Microsoft’s Professional Office Suite, legitimate copies of which sell
in the United States for $600, are available in Moscow for $11.  See Intellectual Property Developments,
EAST/WEST EXECUTIVE GUIDE, Mar. 1, 1996, available in 1996 WL 8665040.  The Moscow Times
Business Journal estimated that software piracy decreased from 91% in 1996, to 89% in 1997, to 64% in
1998.  These figures have not been confirmed by outside sources however.  See Russia: Intellectual
Property Rights Protection: An Overview, INT’L MKT. INSIGHT REP., Mar. 10, 1999, available in 1999
WL 8686531.
56. See Robert Farish, Russian Piracy in a Sea of Software, INDEP. (LONDON), June 14, 1993, at 15
(discussing the institutionalization of software piracy); Microsoft Battling Russian Software Piracy,
ECOTASS, May 25, 1993, at 14, available in 1993 WL 2568045.  An extreme example of software piracy
in Russia occurred when the scientist who “adapted” copyrighted IBM software to run on Soviet main-
frame computers was awarded the USSR State Prize.  See Peter B. Maggs, Legal Regulation of the Dis-
semination of Scientific and Technical Information in the USSR, in SOVIET LAW AND ECONOMY 103,
114 (Olimpiad S. Ioffe & Mark W. Janis eds., 1986).
57. See Patricia Kranz, Taking on the “Superpower of Piracy,” BUS. WK., Dec. 19, 1994, at 116B.  A
major Russian oil company, Gazprom, recently spent over $500,000 on licensed software, but the com-
pany remains an oddity in Russia.  See id.
58. Id.  Microsoft reported that its sales increased by 1000% in the year between July 1993 and
June 1994.  See id.
59. According to Yury Ryzkhov, Chairman of the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet’s Subcom-
mittee on Science and New Technologies, the Russian logic is as follows:  “What point is there in turn-
ing off a spigot through which technology and works of art make their way here on their own and al-
most free of charge at a time when we don’t have the money to buy them in the needed quantities on a
legal basis?”  Mikheyev, supra note 55, at 20.  As one Russian software entrepreneur, Boris Nuraliev,
explains, “[i]n our market, it’s not necessary to explain why or how to use . . . Lexicon [a widely used
Russian word processor], but you do have to explain why to buy it!”  Esther Dyson, Remaking Russia,
By Computer, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 1993, at F27 (describing her visit to Moscow to attend a Software
Market Association conference and her interactions with Russian entrepreneurs).
60. See Software Trade Groups Target Pirates, supra note 55.  SPA Executive Director Ken Wasch
commented that “Russia . . . deserve[s] credit for enacting copyright laws that specifically protect com-
puter programs and other software.  But the astronomical levels of software piracy in [Russia] illus-
NEIGEL_FMT2.DOC 01/02/01  2:40 PM
188 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 63: No. 4
To attack the problems of piracy in Russia, industry groups lobbied the
United States Trade Representative (“USTR”) to use Special 301,61 a weapon in
the United States’ trade arsenal that authorizes the USTR to use trade sanc-
tions or otherwise limit market access against a country that inadequately pro-
tects U.S. intellectual property rights.62  In response, USTR Mickey Kantor
made “special mention” of nine countries whose intellectual property protec-
tions could be improved, including Russia.63  Again, in response to pressure
from industry groups, USTR Kantor placed Russia on the Watch List in 1995;64
and USTR Charlene Barshefsky elevated Russia to the Priority Watch List in
1997.65  Even though Russia remains on the Priority Watch List,66 the United
trate[s] what the SPA has learned in the US and abroad–that the law is just the first step toward legal
software use.”  Id.
61. Special 301 is a provision of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 that author-
izes the USTR to use trade sanctions or other limits on market access to retaliate against inadequate
protection of intellectual property rights.  See 19 U.S.C. § 2101 (1994).  For a detailed explanation of
how Special 301 operates, see Kim Newby, The Effectiveness of Special 301 in Creating Long Term
Copyright Protection for U.S. Companies Overseas, 21 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 29 (1995).  Under
Special 301, the USTR must prepare an annual list of Priority Foreign Countries that deny effective
protection of U.S. intellectual property or deny equitable market access to U.S. persons who rely upon
intellectual property protection.  See 19 U.S.C. §§ 2242(a), 2411(d)(3)(C)(ii) (1994).  Although not re-
quired by statute, the USTR also prepares a Priority Watch List and a Watch List to alert offending
countries that their practices are being monitored by the USTR.  See Newby, supra, at 36.  The Priority
Foreign Country list contains those countries that have the most onerous or egregious practices that
deny protection or equitable market access, countries whose practices have the greatest adverse impact,
either actual or potential, on the relevant U.S. products, and countries that are not engaging in good
faith negotiations to provide effective protection of intellectual property rights.  See 19 U.S.C. §
2242(b)(1) (1994).  After the USTR identifies a Priority Foreign Country, the USTR must within 30
days initiate an investigation of the country and its offending practices and must take action if no sub-
stantial progress has been taken by the Priority Foreign Country within the period of the investigation.
See 19 U.S.C. §§ 2412(b)(2)(A), 2411(a)(1) (1994).  The USTR has broad discretionary authority in de-
ciding what actions to take, but the three main tools include the suspension of trade benefits, the impo-
sition of duties or other import restrictions, and the entering into of binding agreements to stop the of-
fending practices.  See 19 U.S.C. § 2411(c)(1) (1994).
62. The IIPA annually identifies to the USTR countries that violate intellectual property rights.  In
February 1994, the IIPA recommended to USTR Mickey Kantor that Russia be added to the Watch
List.  See Industry Presses U.S. to Act Against Thirty-six Countries for Copyright “Piracy,” 11 Int’l
Trade Rep. (BNA) 274 (Feb. 23, 1994).
63. See USTR Announcement and Fact Sheets on Decisions Affecting Foreign Government Pro-
curement, Intellectual Property Protection, and U.S.-Japan Supercomputer Pact, 11 Int’l Trade Rep.
(BNA) 722 (May 4, 1994).
64. In February 1995, the IIPA recommended elevating Russia to the Priority Watch List.  See
China, Turkey, India, Brazil Faulted for Intellectual Property Inaction, 12 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) 292
(Feb. 15, 1995).  In May 1995, USTR Kantor placed Russia on the Watch List.  See USTR Announce-
ment on Foreign Government Procurement (Title VII) and Intellectual Property Protection (Special 301),
12 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) 791 (May 3, 1995).
65. In 1997, industries dependent on copyrights, including makers of software, movies, and sound
recordings, urged Acting USTR Charlene Barshefsky to threaten trade sanctions against Russia.  Ac-
cording to the IIPA, Russia, Greece, and Paraguay were responsible for $1.29 billion in losses to U.S.
companies as a result of unauthorized copying and sales of movies, music, computer software, and
books.  See Mark Felsonthal, Copyright, Patent Holders Urge Action Against Argentina, India,  Russia,
Others, 14 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) 292 (Feb. 19, 1997).  Later that year, USTR Barshefsky elevated
Russia from the Watch List to the Priority Watch List.  See USTR Launches WTO Proceedings Against
Denmark, Others Over Copyrights, 14 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) 812 (May 7, 1997).
66. See Daniel Pruzin, WTO Postpones Seattle Post-Mortem; Will Take No Action on Missed
Deadline, Int’l Trade Daily, Dec. 20, 1999 (BNA), available in LEXIS, BNA Library, BNAITD File.
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States has not threatened trade sanctions against Russia, in contrast to its mul-
tiple threats against China for similar violations of intellectual property laws.67
Part IV of this article compares how the United States has reacted to violations
of copyright laws in Russia and China.  Before one can consider U.S. reaction to
China’s copyright violations, it is helpful to understand how copyright law de-
veloped indigenously in China and how U.S. trade pressures shaped China’s
copyright regime.  Part III explores the development of China’s copyright laws.
III
HISTORY OF CHINA’S COPYRIGHT LAW
China was among the first countries to develop printing,68 yet it did not enact
its first copyright law until more than one thousand years later.69  During the
thousand-year interval, China developed a modest system of copyright that ac-
commodated the economic, political, and social conditions of the time.70  During
the twentieth century, however, external pressures forced China to adapt its
laws to more stringent international norms.71
A. Indigenous Development of China’s Copyright Law
Before the twentieth century, China had no formal copyright system.72  More
than one thousand years earlier, however, China had begun to enact rules to
control the dissemination of ideas.73  Emperors, beginning with the Wenzong
Emperor in A.D. 835, prohibited the unauthorized reproduction of items that
67. See discussion infra Part III.B.
68. See WILLIAM P. ALFORD, TO STEAL A BOOK IS AN ELEGANT OFFENSE: INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAW IN CHINESE CIVILIZATION 1 (1995) [hereinafter ALFORD, TO STEAL A BOOK] (trac-
ing the development of copyright law in China, from the advent of printing during the Tang Dynasty
(A.D. 618-906) to modern-day China and examining why copyright law has never taken hold in China
as it has in the West).  Chinese historians date the advent of printing to the Tang Dynasty (A.D. 618–
906): China is credited with contributing paper, movable type, and ink to humankind.  See id. at 1, 9.
Even before the invention of the printing press, the Chinese were interested in preventing the unau-
thorized reproduction of texts: During the Qin Dynasty (221B.C.–206 B.C.), the rulers were concerned
with the distribution of written materials, and during the Han Dynasty (206 B.C.–A.D. 220), the rulers
barred the unauthorized reproduction of the Classics.  See id. at 12-13.
69. See ZHENG CHENGSI & MICHAEL PENDLETON, COPYRIGHT LAW IN CHINA 17 (1991) (dis-
cussing the enactment of China’s first official copyright law in 1910 and the enactment of its first copy-
right law that met international standards in 1990).
70. See William P. Alford, Don’t Stop Thinking About . . . Yesterday: Why There Was No Indige-
nous Counterpart to Intellectual Property Law in Imperial China, 7 J. CHINESE L. 3, 7-34 (1993) (de-
scribing the development of China’s system of copyright through its imperial history).
71. See Julia Cheng, Note, China’s Copyright System: Rising to the Spirit of TRIPS Requires an In-
ternal Focus and WTO Membership, 21 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1941, 1965-79 (1998) (examining the ef-
fect of threatened trade sanctions by the United States on the development and enforcement of China’s
copyright laws).
72. See ZHENG CHENGSI & MICHAEL D. PENDLETON, CHINESE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER LAW 87 (1987).
73. See ALFORD, TO STEAL A BOOK, supra note 68, at 16-17.  The rulers were motivated by a de-
sire to sustain imperial power more than any interest in sharing information with the Chinese people.
See id.
NEIGEL_FMT2.DOC 01/02/01  2:40 PM
190 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 63: No. 4
could be used for prognostication.74  Subsequent emperors expanded the ban to
include heterodox items and materials under the exclusive control of the state,
such as the Classics and official government documents.75  After the invention of
the printing press, production of printed materials increased, and Chinese em-
perors ordered private printers to submit works to government officials for pre-
publication review.76
China’s desire to control the dissemination of information was shared by
European governments.  The early history of intellectual property laws in
Europe developed out of a similar desire of the state to control the spread of in-
formation.77 European attitudes toward copyright diverged from that of China
in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, however, when European societies
adopted the view that an author had a property right in his work,78 a concept
that had no counterpart in China.79  Europeans believed that society would
benefit by providing incentives to create and disseminate works.  China, on the
other hand, continued to regulate the creation of works, with the goal of main-
taining the state’s authority.80
Finally, in 1910, just one year before the overthrow of the Qing Dynasty
(A.D. 1644–1911), the government enacted China’s first formal copyright law.81
The law provided comprehensive copyright protection.82  It was never fully im-
plemented, however, because the Qing government was overthrown by the
Northern Warlords government (1912–1927) the following year.83  Both the
Northern Warlords government and the subsequent Nationalist (Guomindang)
74. See id. at 13.  Chinese rulers prohibited the unauthorized reproduction of calendars, almanacs,
and other items that could be used for prognostication because rulers sought to control information re-
lated to time and astronomy.  See id. at 13.
75. See ALFORD, TO STEAL A BOOK , supra note 68, at 13.  In addition to items of prognostication,
materials subject to exclusive state control included the Classics, state legal pronouncements, official
histories, model answers to imperial civil service examinations, maps, and materials concerning the in-
ner workings of the government, politics, and military affairs.  See id. at 13-14.  Heterodox materials
included pornographic materials, politically or religiously suspect materials, and writings that used the
names of members or ancestors of the imperial family in inappropriate literary styles.  See id. at 14, 23-
24.
76. See ALFORD, TO STEAL A BOOK, supra note 68, at 13-17.  Even though prepublication review
started much earlier, the Qianlong Emperor’s famous decree of 1774 required all literature to be re-
viewed so that any books containing heterodox material could be destroyed.  See id. at 15.
77. See PLOMAN & HAMILTON, supra note 1, at 9.
78. See id. at 11.
79. See ALFORD, TO STEAL A BOOK, supra note 68, at 18.
80. See id.  Economic and technological factors partly explain China’s failure to protect authors’
creations.  See id. at 19.  The mechanisms and demand for mass production did not exist in China as
they did in Europe.  Preindustrial China did not have means of mass production, and the literacy rate
was under 20% even in the early part of the twentieth century.  See id.
81. See CHENGSI & PENDLETON, COPYRIGHT LAW IN CHINA, supra note 69, at 17.
82. See Amy E. Simpson, Comment, Copyright Law and Software Regulations in the People’s Re-
public of China: Have the Chinese Pirates Affected World Trade, 20 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 575,
582 (1995) (explaining that the copyright law of 1910 offered extensive protection to works of literature
and art, pamphlets, calligraphy, photographs, sculptures, and models).
83. See CHENGSI & PENDLETON, COPYRIGHT LAW IN CHINA, supra note 69, at 17.
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government (1912–1949) revised the statute in 1915 and 1928, respectively.84
But China’s copyright law was short-lived.
In 1949, the Communist Party rose to power and overturned all existing
copyright and publication laws.85  Mao Tse-Tung and the Chinese Communist
Party expelled all foreigners and foreign influence from the state.86  As part of
the Chinese Communist Party’s promise of a better life, the government initi-
ated a system of publishing contracts that provided remuneration between
authors and publishers.87  Even though the publishing contracts provided royal-
ties to authors, the system failed adequately to protect authors’ copyrights be-
cause the publishing contracts did not control unauthorized reproduction by
third parties.88  Even this limited system of copyright was short-lived; royalties
were significantly reduced in 1958 when Mao Tse-Tung launched the Anti-
Rightist Movement and the Great Leap Forward to accelerate China’s transi-
tion to socialism.89  Later, all royalties were eliminated, and the system of pub-
lishing contracts was dismantled when the Cultural Revolution began in 1966.90
The Cultural Revolution was a tumultuous period in which most creative intel-
lectual work stopped, and copyright infringement was rampant.91
By the end of the Cultural Revolution, China faced a faltering economy and
an ineffective and unproductive bureaucratic system.92  Instead of producing a
better life for the Chinese people, the Communist Party produced unneeded
goods while the demands of the Chinese consumers remained unfulfilled.93  Af-
ter Mao Tse-Tung’s death in 1976, Deng Xiaoping and his allies adopted an
84. See id.
85. See Mark Sidel, Copyright, Trademark, and Patent Law in the People’s Republic of China, 21
TEX. INT’L L.J. 259, 261 (1986).
86. See Janiece Marshall, Current Developments in the People’s Republic of China: Has China
Changed?,  1 TRANSNAT’L LAW. 505, 508 (1988) (explaining that the Chinese Communist Party prom-
ised the Chinese people a better life by modernizing the country and rescuing the nation from invasion
by imperialistic states).
87. See Sidel, supra note 85, at 261-63.  During the 1950s, the General Publishing Office of the Cen-
tral People’s Government issued public resolutions that governed the publishing contracts between
authors and publishers.  See Yiping Yang, The 1990 Copyright Law of the People’s Republic of China,
11 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 260, 263 (1993).  The 1950 Publishing Resolution provided a per-word and
per-copy royalty system.  See Sidel, supra note 85, at 263.  This system of publishing contracts was later
dismantled during the Cultural Revolution.  See id.
88. See Sidel, supra note 85, at 262.
89. See id. at 263.
90. See Yang, supra note 87, at 263.
91. See Sidel, supra note 85, at 263.  During the ten years of the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976),
most creative intellectual work stopped.  See id. at 263-64.  The Communist Party tortured, killed, and
imprisoned many intellectuals; it sent others to work on communes or state farms.  See id. at 263.  Ac-
cording to official materials published in connection with the trial of the “Gang of Four,” 720,000 per-
sons were directly persecuted during the Cultural Revolution, and 34,000 among them were killed.  See
ALBERT HUNG-YEE CHEN, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC
OF CHINA 30 (1994).  Less egregious offenses were also committed:  The state government endorsed
copyright infringement when it promulgated regulations in 1972 that permitted a publisher to reprint
another publisher’s work without permission or payment so long as the reprinting publisher noted the
name of the original publisher.  See Sidel, supra note 85, at 264.
92. See Marshall, supra note 86, at 508.
93. See id. at 509.
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economic development plan to bring China out of economic isolation and to at-
tract foreign investment, trade, and the transfer of technology.94  China “essen-
tially abandoned Marxist economics in favor of a dual system, namely, a one-
party autocratic political system, coupled with a government assisted free mar-
ket economy.”95  When China adopted its Open Door Policy in the late 1970s,
Western nations, primarily the United States, pressured China to enact more
protective intellectual property laws.96  China responded in 1990 by enacting its
Copyright Law of the People’s Republic of China (“Copyright Law of the
P.R.C.”), the first one that met international standards.97  China’s copyright law
granted private rights to authors but maintained a socialist purpose,98 illustrating
China’s efforts to adopt a market economy within a socialist governmental
framework.99
China incorporated international norms into its copyright law, but the law
offered limited protection for foreign works.  It protected a work by a foreign
entity only if the work was first published in China or if it was published in
China within thirty days of its initial foreign publication.100  The U.S. business
94. See id. at 508-10 (describing Deng Xiaoping’s plan to revitalize China’s faltering economy by
attracting foreign trade and investment).  This policy was antithetical to China’s previous policies of
isolation and exclusion under Mao Tse-Tung.  See id. at 509-10.  The economic development plan,
termed “The Four Modernizations,” had four goals: (1) to reform aspects of the political and policy-
making system; (2) to revitalize and reform the educational system; (3) to change China’s orientation to
and role in the global economy; and (4) to alter the nation’s demographic trajectory.  See id. at 509.
The leaders believed that China would never reach a state of economic development equal to that of
the Western countries unless it increased its application of modern technology to all sectors of the Chi-
nese economy.  See id.
95. Roy J. Girasa, Legal Aspects of Doing Business in China, 20 WESTCHESTER B.J. 305, 305
(1993).  For a complete description of the legal reforms in China during the period of reform, see DU
XICHUAN & ZHANG LINGYUAN, CHINA’S LEGAL SYSTEM: A GENERAL SURVEY (1990).
96. See Yang, supra note 87, at 260.
97. Copyright Law of the People’s Republic of China (1990), THE LAWS OF THE PEOPLE’S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA: 1990-1992, at 75 (Science Press 1993) [hereinafter Copyright Law].  Before en-
acting the Copyright Law of the P.R.C., the Chinese government issued one of its most important ad-
ministrative regulations, the 1984 Regulation, which embodied the principle “to each according to his
labor,” and which was designed to promote intellectual creation by protecting the rights of authors and
translators.  See Simpson, supra note 82, at 585.  The Chinese State Council established the National
Copyright Administration of China to write the copyright law.  See id. at 586.  China’s copyright law
required twenty drafts and eleven years to complete.  See Edward G. Durney, Copyright Law in China
and Taiwan, in GLOBAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY SERIES 1993: PROTECTING TRADEMARKS AND
COPYRIGHTS; SUCCESSFUL STRATEGIES, 311, 315 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, & Literary
Property Course Handbook Series No. 367, 1993).
98. See White Paper: Intellectual Property Protection in China, BRITISH BROADCASTING CORP.,
June 20, 1994, available in LEXIS, World Library, BBCMIR File (noting that China’s stated purpose in
developing its intellectual property system was “to rapidly develop social productive forces, promote
overall social progress, meet the needs of developing a socialist market economy and expedite China’s
entry into the world economy”).  Article 1 of the Copyright Law of the P.R.C. provides:
This law is formulated in accordance with the Constitution to protect the copyright of authors
on their literary, artistic and scientific works as well as rights and interests related to copyright,
to encourage the creation and dissemination of works beneficial to the building of a socialist
society that is advanced materially as well as culturally and ideologically and to promote the
progress and prosperity of socialist culture and science.
Copyright Law, supra note 97, at 77-78.
99. See Durney, supra note 97, at 315.
100. See Simpson, supra note 82, at 590-91.
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community strongly disapproved of the original version of the Copyright Law of
the P.R.C., and the U.S. government threatened trade sanctions against China,101
the first in a series of trade disputes between the United States and China over
intellectual property protection.102
B. Development of China’s Copyright Law in Response to External Pressures
Even though China substantially incorporated international copyright
norms into its copyright law, the U.S. business community lobbied the U.S. De-
partment of Commerce to pressure China to change its law to provide stronger
protection for foreign works.103  In response to the U.S. business sector’s com-
plaints and lobbying efforts, the USTR retaliated against China and invoked
Special 301.104  Pursuant to Special 301, the USTR placed China on the Priority
Foreign Country list and threatened trade sanctions against China unless it pro-
vided more protection for U.S. intellectual property works, particularly com-
puter software.105
Lengthy negotiations between the United States and China resulted in a
comprehensive agreement, the Memorandum of Understanding on the Protec-
tion of Intellectual Property, in January 1992 (“1992 MOU”).106  The 1992 MOU
was signed just two hours before U.S. retaliatory measures were to be imple-
mented.107  The 1992 MOU required China to increase its protection of U.S. in-
tellectual property and to join two international copyright conventions—the
Berne Convention and the Convention for the Protection of Producers of Pho-
nograms Against Unauthorized Duplication of Their Phonograms108—which
101. See id. at 591.
102. See infra Part III.B (discussing U.S.-China trade disputes over China’s lack of enforcement of
its copyright laws).
103. See Cheng, supra note 71, at 1967-68.  For a detailed description of the lobbying efforts of U.S.
industry on the United States Trade Representative, see Paul C.B. Liu, U.S. Industry’s Influence on In-
tellectual Property Negotiations and Special 301 Actions, 13 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 87, 88-93 (1994).
104. For an explanation of Special 301, see supra note 61.  See also June Cohan Lazar, Protecting
Ideas and Ideals: Copyright Law in the People’s Republic of China, 27 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 1185,
1188 (1996); Newby, supra note 61, at 36.  The United States has recognized that a foreign govern-
ment’s tolerance of piracy may constitute a non-tariff barrier with trade distortion effects.  See Y. Kurt
Chang, Special 301 and Taiwan: A Case Study of Protecting United States Intellectual Property in For-
eign Countries, 15 NW J. INT’L L. & BUS. 206, 212 (1994).
105. See Lazar, supra note 104, at 1188.  After being placed on the list, China agreed to protect
computer programs as literary works under the terms of the Berne Convention, and implemented the
Computer Software Protection Regulations (“Computer Software Regulations”).  See Computer Soft-
ware Protection Regulations, CHINA L. & PRAC., Aug. 19, 1991, at 55 (effective Oct. 1, 1991).  After
the Chinese government issued the Computer Software Regulations in 1991, U.S. businesses remained
dissatisfied, and China remained on the Priority Foreign Country list.  See Jeffrey K. Parker, Lawyers
Wary of China’s New Software Protection Rules, UPI, June 14, 1991, available in LEXIS, News Library,
UPI File.
106. See U.S.-P.R.C., Memorandum of Understanding on the Protection of Intellectual Property,
Jan. 17, 1992, 34 I.L.M. 676 [hereinafter Memorandum].
107. See Newby, supra note 61, at 42.
108. See Memorandum, supra note 106, at 680-81.
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China joined in 1992 and 1993, respectively.109  Pursuant to the 1992 MOU, the
United States recognized China’s progress and removed it from the Priority
Foreign Country List.110
Subsequently, the United States became frustrated with the Chinese gov-
ernment’s lack of enforcement of its intellectual property laws, and USTR
Mickey Kantor again placed China on the Priority Foreign Country list in
1994111 and threatened Special 301 trade sanctions worth $1.08 billion on Chi-
nese products.112  The Chinese government retaliated by threatening its own
trade sanctions against the United States; the Chinese government was upset
that it had diligently modified its copyright system in compliance with U.S. de-
mands, yet the United States had not allowed sufficient time for the system to
produce the desired results.113
The two countries averted a threatened trade war when they signed a last-
minute agreement, China-United States: Agreement Regarding Intellectual
Property Rights (“1995 Agreement”).114  The 1995 Agreement contained two
documents: a letter from the Chinese Minister of Foreign Trade and Economic
Cooperation to the USTR (“Agreement Letter”) and an Action Plan for Effec-
tive Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights in China (“Ac-
tion Plan”).115  The 1995 Agreement provided for enhanced enforcement meas-
ures by the Chinese and greater access for U.S. intellectual property producers
to Chinese markets, particularly the audio-visual sector.116
109. See Cheng, supra note 71, at 1968.  To harmonize its laws with the Berne Convention, China
promulgated the Implementing International Copyright Treaties Provisions.  See Implementing Inter-
national Copyright Treaties Provisions, CHINA L. & PRAC., Jan. 14, 1993, at 36 (effective Sept. 30,
1992).
110. See Memorandum, supra note 106, at 683-84.  The USTR moved China to the lower-level
Watch List, which contained 17 other offending countries.  See Newby, supra note 61, at 43.
111. See Newby, supra note 61, at 43.
112. See U.S., China Announce Broad Agreement on Intellectual Property Protection, 12 Int’l Trade
Rep. (BNA) 400 (Mar. 1, 1995).
113. See Newby, supra note 61, at 43-44.  Li Changxu, head of the China United Intellectual Prop-
erty Investigation Center, commented, “It’s like building a house.  You can have the house structure all
set up, very beautiful.  But then, you need electricity and water pipes.  That takes more time.”  Marcus
W. Brauchli & Joseph Kahn, Intellectual Property: China Moves Against Piracy as U.S. Trade Battle
Looms, ASIAN WALL ST. J., Jan. 6, 1995, at 1.  China reported progress in its efforts to curb copyright
piracy:  According to the official Xinhua news agency, in early November 1994, approximately 53,000
laser disks were confiscated and over 100 shops wholesaling illegal audio and video products were
closed.  See China Reports Efforts on Copyright Piracy, ASIAN WALL ST. J., Jan. 11, 1995, at 4.  Despite
the Chinese government’s efforts, the Business Software Alliance, the industry group representing
major U.S. computer software publishers, reported that Chinese software piracy cost the industry $322
million in 1994 and that approximately 94 percent of the software in China was pirated.  See Software
Industry Believes U.S. Will Stay Tough on Piracy, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Jan. 3, 1995, available in
LEXIS, News Library, AFP File.
114. See Agreement Regarding Intellectual Property Rights, Feb. 26, 1995, P.R.C.-U.S., 34 I.L.M.
881 (1995) [hereinafter 1995 Agreement].
115. See id.
116. See id. at 882-83.  A spokesman for the IIPA referred to the 1995 Agreement “as a real begin-
ning of a crackdown on piracy.”  See U.S., China Announce Broad Agreement on Intellectual Property
Protection, supra note 112, at 400.  According to USTR Mickey Kantor, “[o]ur Chinese counterparts
have committed themselves to a very impressive set of enforcement procedures here, not only en-
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Despite the optimism surrounding the 1995 Agreement, U.S. officials subse-
quently charged that China had failed to adequately implement the Action
Plan; Chinese officials countered that they had made great strides in reducing
copyright infringement.117  According to the 1995 Agreement, the Chinese gov-
ernment agreed to crack down on piracy of music, films, and software118 and
later promised to shut down twenty-nine compact disc (“CD”) factories that
were the worst offenders.119  American investigators found, however, that only
one factory remained closed, and production of pirated CDs doubled in China
in the ten months following the 1995 Agreement.120  For the third time since en-
acting the Special 301 provisions, the United States placed China on the Priority
Foreign Country list.121  Within thirty minutes of the announcement by Acting
USTR Charlene Barshefsky that the United States had placed China on its Pri-
ority Foreign Country list, China published its own retaliation list of U.S. prod-
ucts that would be subject to 100% tariffs; the list was identical to the U.S. list
of Chinese products.122  Despite the threats, both countries averted another
multibillion-dollar trade war when they reached an agreement hours after a
June 17, 1996, deadline.123  Acting USTR Barshefsky announced that the United
States would withdraw the threat of $2 billion trade sanctions because China
had taken serious and important steps to combat piracy in recent months, in-
cluding the closure of fifteen pirate CD factories and the enlistment of China’s
forcement, but market access as well.”  Id.  A key aspect of the settlement was the raiding and closure
of seven of twenty-nine factories producing pirated music compact disks and movie laser disks.  See id.
117. See Andrew J. McCall, Copyright and Trademark Enforcement in China, 9 TRANSNAT’L LAW.
587, 603-05 (1996).
118. See 1995 Agreement, supra note 114, at 883.
119. See Maggie Farley, Peril Escalates for Team Fighting Piracy of CDs, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 25, 1995,
at D4.
120. See Joseph Kahn, China Plans to Cut Tariffs, End Quotas in Bid to Join Trade Group, WALL
ST. J., Nov. 20, 1995, at A10 [hereinafter Smith, U.S. Trade Officials Plan to Fault China].  According to
U.S. officials, piracy of music and computer software actually increased in the year following the 1995
Agreement.  See Craig S. Smith, U.S. Trade Officials Plan to Fault China on its Lax Antipiracy Steps,
New Curbs, WALL ST. J., Feb. 7, 1996, at A10.  U.S. businesses continued to lose revenues after the
1995 Agreement because the Chinese government failed to curb piracy.  According to Steven Ballmer,
then-Executive Vice President for Microsoft, China’s software market in 1995 was about equal to that
of France, yet Microsoft’s China revenues were only about three percent of the total for France.  See
Craig S. Smith, Microsoft Says Pirate Copies Sap China Profits, WALL ST. J., Oct. 27, 1995, available in
1995 WL-WSJ 9905759.  The IIPA estimated its 1995 losses to Chinese piracy at $1.84 billion, excluding
business software, and the Software Publisher’s Association estimated business software losses at $250
million a year.  See Marcus W. Brauchli, China Could Face U.S. Trade Sanctions of Over $2 Billion Due
to Piracy Losses, WALL ST. J., Feb. 26, 1996, at A9.
121. See Rossella Brevetti, USTR Identifies China as Priority Foreign Country, 13 Int’l Trade Rep.
(BNA) 704 (May 1, 1996).  In previous negotiating sessions, acting USTR Charlene Barshefsky had
threatened Chinese officials with $2 billion in trade sanctions if China did not make sufficient progress
in several areas: closing six factories that produced pirated compact disks and laser disks, increasing
market access for U.S. entertainment and publishing firms, and strengthening customs controls.  See
Robert S. Greenberger, U.S. Sharply Attacks China Over Intellectual Property, WALL ST. J., May 1,
1996, at A3.
122. See Helene Cooper & Kathy Chen, U.S. and China Announce Tariff Targets as Both Nations
Step Up Trade Rhetoric, WALL ST. J., May 16, 1996, at A3.
123. See Kathy Chen, U.S. and China Reach an Agreement, Averting Trade Sanctions by Both Sides,
WALL ST. J., June 18, 1996, at A2.
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powerful national police, the Ministry of Public Security, to help combat pi-
racy.124  The 1996 Agreement recounted the 1995 Agreement, but U.S. officials
expressed optimism that “things will be different this time around.”125
China made significant progress in combating piracy after signing the 1996
Agreement.  Chinese authorities closed thirty-nine factories making illegal
copies of U.S. music, movies, and business software, and it arrested more than
250 individuals.126 Piracy problems persist, however, including widespread com-
puter software piracy.127  Moreover, movie piracy is on the rise:  Video compact
disks of the “Titanic” sold for US$2 in Shanghai one month before its theatrical
release in the United States, and Chinese authorities essentially abandoned
their efforts to prevent the sale of illegally copied videodisks.128  The United
States has vowed to impose trade sanctions should China reduce its efforts to
fight piracy of U.S. works.129  However, despite the widespread piracy of U.S.
software and movies, the United States has not officially threatened trade sanc-
tions since 1996.  Chinese piracy of U.S. products remains an area of contention
between the United States and China, and the United States is grappling with
strategies to combat China’s piracy of valuable U.S. intellectual property.
IV
ANALYSIS OF THE U.S. RESPONSE TO PIRACY IN RUSSIA AND CHINA
The United States reacted aggressively against China when it engaged in
widespread piracy and failed to protect U.S. intellectual property.130  U.S. reac-
tion toward Russia, however, was comparatively mild.131  When China failed
adequately to protect U.S. intellectual property, the United States placed China
on the Priority Country List under Special 301 and threatened trade sanctions
on three separate occasions.  In 1991 and 1994, trade sanctions were averted
124. See Statement by Acting USTR Charlene Barshefsky on Trade Talks with China on Intellectual
Property Rights and Fact Sheet on Chinese Implementation of 1995 IPR Enforcement Agreement, 13
Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1036, (June 19, 1996) [hereinafter Statement by Acting USTR]; see also Mark
Felsenthal, U.S., China Agree on Copyright Shields; $2 Billion Sanction Threat is Dropped, 13 Int’l
Trade Rep. (BNA) 998 (June 19, 1996).
125. Chen, supra note 123, at A2.  U.S. industry officials expressed optimism over the 1996 Agree-
ment:  Dianne Sullivan, the director of trade policy for the National Association of Manufacturers,
called the agreement a step forward in establishing better relations with China.  See U.S., China Agree
on Copyright Shields, supra note 124, at 998.
126. See Trade Report Cites Chinese Progress on Piracy, HOUS. CHRON., May 1, 1997, Business Sec-
tion at 2.
127. See U.S.-China Trade Relation (June 17, 1997) (testimony of acting USTR Charlene Barshef-
sky in House Ways and Means Trade Subcommittee), available in 1997 WL 11233854.  The Software
Publishers Association announced figures for estimated losses to piracy and found no improvement in
China in the last three years.  See Seth Faison, Chinese Cracking Down on the Pirating of CD’s, N.Y.
TIMES, June 24, 1998, at A10.  Although U.S. figures vary widely, industry groups estimate that U.S.
entertainment and software companies lost between $500 million and $1 billion in 1998 due to piracy in
China.  See Tomlinson, supra note 53, at 6.
128. See Faison, supra note 127, at A10.
129. See U.S.-China Trade Relations, supra note 127.
130. See supra text accompanying notes 103–129.
131. See supra text accompanying notes 36–66.
NEIGEL_FMT2.DOC 01/02/01  2:40 PM
Page 179: Autumn 2000] PIRACY IN RUSSIA & CHINA 197
when China agreed to increase its protection of U.S. intellectual property.  In
1996, however, China retaliated with its own trade sanctions, and the United
States withdrew its threats.  Since 1996, the United States has not invoked Spe-
cial 301 against China.
On the other hand, the United States has never threatened trade sanctions
against Russia.  The United States did place Russia on the Watch List and,
later, the Priority Watch List,132 but the USTR never elevated Russia to the Pri-
ority Foreign Country List and never threatened trade sanctions.  There are
several possible explanations for the disparate treatment.  First, after the col-
lapse of the Soviet Union, the United States became a staunch supporter of
President Yeltsin and the Russian government.133  The United States feared that
Russia would revert to communism if President Yeltsin were perceived as weak
or if the economy faltered significantly.  Trade sanctions could have precisely
these effects.  Opponents of President Yeltsin’s reforms would use the threat-
ened trade sanctions as evidence of Russia’s weak position vis-à-vis the West in
their propaganda battles for the hearts and minds of Russian citizens.  Trade
sanctions would also weaken an already unstable economy.  To prevent these
undesirable outcomes, the United States opted to tolerate Russian abuses of
U.S. intellectual property rights in the short term.
Second, China was a much more significant trading partner than was Russia.
In 1998, the United States imported almost $6 billion in goods from China and
exported more than $1 billion in goods.134  In the same period, the United States
imported one-tenth of that amount of goods from Russia—less than $500 mil-
lion worth—and exported less than $300 million worth.135  The United States
sought to reduce the trade deficit with China by threatening China with denial
of access to the U.S. market.  The United States also viewed China as a poten-
tially huge market for U.S. goods, and used Special 301 as a tool to open up
China’s market.  Russia, on the other hand, was still a relatively small market
and would likely remain so in the short term until the Russian economy was re-
formed.  The United States did not consider trade sanctions as a necessary part
of its economic strategy toward Russia.
Third, U.S. reaction toward China was influenced by events in Tiananmen
Square and other human rights abuses, as well as China’s export of arms and
nuclear technology to developing countries.  When the United States consid-
ered Special 301 action against China in 1991, it was at least somewhat affected
by China’s negative image in the United States in the aftermath of Tiananmen
Square.  Additionally, some U.S. leaders viewed negatively China’s ballooning
trade surplus with the United States, allegations that China forced political
132. Russia remains on the Priority Watch List.
133. President Bush and President Kohl of Germany announced that the United States and Ger-
many and their allies would give Russia $24 billion in aid.  See Joel Kurtzman, Bush’s Surprise Plan to
Help Yeltsin’s Government, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5, 1992, §3, at 2.
134. See International Financial Statistics CD-ROM, International Monetary Fund, Wash., D.C.
(Nov. 1999).
135. See id.
NEIGEL_FMT2.DOC 01/02/01  2:40 PM
198 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 63: No. 4
prisoners to produce goods for export markets, and reports of China’s export of
arms and nuclear technology.136  Even though Russia also engaged in human
rights abuses in its past, the United States appeared willing to forgive past sins
of the Soviet state and judge the Russian government anew.
Fourth, the United States sought to maintain good relations with Russia so
that the U.S. government could influence Russia’s policies of disarmament and
nuclear non-proliferation.  The United States was concerned that Russia would
be tempted to sell off nuclear weapons and knowledge to support its weakened
economy.  Trade sanctions, by worsening Russia’s financial position, could en-
courage such undesirable behavior.
Finally, unlike Russia, China’s piracy efforts were aimed at both its domestic
market and export markets.  The Business Software Alliance reported that
China had the capacity to produce ninety million CDs per year, yet its domestic
market could only absorb five million CDs annually.137  China actually exported
most of its pirated music and software to the West; therefore, its low-cost, pi-
rated works competed directly against legitimate U.S. goods.138  Russia, on the
other hand, produced its pirated works primarily for domestic consumption, or,
at most, for consumption in the former Soviet republics.139  Even though the
United States disapproved of piracy in Russia, it abhorred China’s blatant ef-




Even though the development of copyright law in Russia and China is simi-
lar in many respects—both developed their copyright laws later than did West-
ern Europe; both refused to adopt international copyright agreements until in-
ternational pressure mounted; and both refused adequately to protect foreign
works—Russia and China experienced very different treatment from the
United States when U.S. copyrights were violated.  The United States aggres-
sively pursued trade sanctions against China when it failed adequately to pro-
tect U.S. intellectual property, while it adopted a comparatively mild approach
with Russia.  The United States used Special 301 to threaten China with trade
136. See Keith Bradsher, Panel Asks Bush to Cite Three Nations, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 1991, at D1.
The 1991 debate over granting most-favored nation status to China was dominated by similar issues:
human rights, including oppression in Tibet and the trials of dissidents; Beijing’s soaring trade surplus
with the United States, with Chinese exports booming at the same time that imports were restricted;
the export of products made by Chinese prisoners who are paid little or nothing for their work; and ac-
cusations that Beijing is secretly selling weapons and nuclear technology to Algeria, Pakistan, and other
developing countries.  See Nicholas D. Kristof, Chinese Ties: Frosty to Icy, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 1991, at
A13.
137. See Smith, U.S. Trade Officials Plan to Fault China, supra note 120, at A10.
138. See id.
139. At least some of the pirated works shipped to the former Soviet republics eventually entered
Western markets.  See Almar Latour, Russian Lawyer Cracks Down on Piracy, WALL ST. J., June 9,
1997, at 13B.
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sanctions but has never pursued such remedies against Russia.  There are sev-
eral reasons for the past disparate treatment.
The United States pursued different political, economic, and military goals
in its relationships with Russia and China.  First, the United States supported
President Yeltsin and the Russian government after the collapse of the Soviet
Union and sought to strengthen the Russian economy, not to undermine it with
threats of trade sanctions.  Second, the United States sought to reduce its trade
imbalance with China through threatened trade sanctions.  Third, Tiananmen
Square and other human rights abuses by China influenced U.S. policy toward
China.  Fourth, the United States sought to maintain good relations with Russia
to influence its policies of disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation.  Finally,
the United States more aggressively attacked piracy in China because China
exported its pirated works into Western markets, where the low-cost, pirated
works competed directly against legitimate U.S. works.  For all of these reasons,
the United States has pursued China’s copyright abuses more aggressively than
it has pursued similar abuses by Russia.
In the immediate future, the United States remains unlikely to invoke Spe-
cial 301 against Russia for the reasons mentioned herein.  Similarly, the United
States is unlikely to invoke Special 301 against China, given the importance of
U.S.-China relations and the United States’ most recent failure at threatening
sanctions in 1996.  As China becomes a greater economic power, able effec-
tively to wield trade weapons against its economic opponents, the United States
must consider other avenues for relief from piracy and other violations of in-
tellectual property laws.  Perhaps China’s accession to the World Trade Organi-
zation will provide the relief the United States seeks.  On the contrary, when
Russia stabilizes its economic and political systems, the United States may con-
sider invoking Special 301 and threatening trade sanctions to force Russia to
provide greater protection for U.S. intellectual property.
